For the first fall faculty research seminar, Xiaodong Zhang, a visiting scholar, will be presenting his research on political career concerns and firm-level credit rationing. The seminar will take place in CH203 and via Zoom. All comments and feedback are welcome. His talk will be offered both in person and online. Please find the presentation topics below.
Zoom Meeting ID: 923 2657 7294
Passcode: 539642
Title: Political Career Concerns and Firm-Level Credit Rationing: Evidence from Chinese Cities
Abstract: Efficient credit allocation is central to private-sector growth, yet political incentives often redirect financial resources. Using China’s cadre promotion system, we show that mayors eligible for promotion expand infrastructure investment through bank-financed debt, raising local government liabilities by 13% of GDP. This debt expansion crowds out private firms, reducing their credit access, investment, employment, and productivity. The distortion is weaker for state-owned and infrastructure-related firms, highlighting unequal access to finance. Our findings reveal how career concerns of local officials translate into financial repression, offering new evidence on the institutional origins of capital misallocation in developing economies.
