

This is a pre-copyedited version of a manuscript published in *International Review of Studies on Emotion*, 2, 197-218. Edited by K. T. Strongman @ John Wiley & Sons Ltd. (1992)

Emotional Climate: Social Structure and Emotional Dynamics

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The basic idea of emotional climate is relatively easy to grasp. I have in mind an objective group phenomenon that can be palpably sensed-as when one enters a party or a city and feels an atmosphere of gaiety or depression, openness or fear-only, as the term "climate" implies, I am less interested in temporary moods than in more pervasive emotional phenomena that are related to underlying social structures and political programs. I have in mind, for example, the climate of fear which existed in Chile during the Pinochet regime and which has recently changed to a climate of hope (see, for example, Becker *et al.*, 1990).

THE CONCEPT OF EMOTIONAL CLIMATE

While emotional climate is an appealing idea, it is an idea that is relatively difficult to make into a precise concept that can be objectively measured. How does one distinguish between temporary moods and pervasive climates? Is an emotional climate objective or subjective? How does a national mood differ from an individual's emotion? How can climates be described? And how can one measure an emotional climate when people in different neighborhoods, regions or social classes may feel quite differently? How does emotional climate function, and how does it relate to underlying social-political structures? I shall attempt to deal with these issues but they are inextricably interwoven and this paper is a heuristic enterprise rather than an attempt to answer definitely the problems that are posed.

Emotional atmosphere, climate, and culture

An emotional atmosphere or collective mood-as opposed to an emotional' climate-pertains to the collective behavior that a group or society may manifest when it is focused on a common event, rather than to the emotional relationships between members of the society. Park (1967) describes such emotional moods, when a crowd becomes a mob, or when a group attends a funeral or a wedding, or when an entire society develops a collective attitude.

Speaking of the development of a mob, he notes that the attention of every individual is focused on some exciting object or incident and then, "the excitement of every individual is intensified by the response each unconsciously makes to the manifest interest of every other individual. The crowd assumes under these circumstances the character of a closed circuit, each individual responding to his own excitement as he sees it reflected via the attitudes and emotions of his neighbor...until the crowd is a collective unit." (Park, 1967, p. 257.) In an analogous way, a society may become mobilized. In fact, Park notes that every society, "faces in the direction from which the news comes," and alters its attitude to conform to what is reported in the press. This, of course, may be manipulated by the political leadership. Thus, Park quotes William Schirer's *Berlin Diary*, "the purpose of all the ceremony and ritual of the Nazis is it creates an atmosphere, a tension, an expectancy, which, in focusing attention upon the things hoped for, will effectively inhibit any consideration that runs counter to those hopes." (p. 259)

Emotional atmospheres are important in their own right and may blend into some of the climates I shall discuss and be reflected in attempts to measure climate. Furthermore, a shift in emotional atmosphere may herald a change in climate. Thus, Park mentions how Franklin D. Roosevelt's famous fireside talk of March 12, 1933 began to turn a climate of depression into one of confidence, restored morale, and promoted unification. However, an emotional climate is more lasting than a local emotional atmosphere and does not simply refer to collective feeling and behavior but to how the people of a society emotionally relate to one another—for example, whether they care for one another or are afraid of each other. Thus, an atmosphere of joy, or one of fear, might exist if the people of a nation focused on a common victory, or on an impending invasion, whereas a climate of joy, or one of fear, might exist if the persons of a nation met each

other's needs or if a repressive government planted spies among the people so that no trust could exist.

While an emotional climate may often be labeled by using names for emotions, such as joy and fear, we may also use labels that directly refer to the emotional relationships that are involved, such as hostility or solidarity. Such labels might also be used to refer to qualities of a society's emotional culture.

However, an emotional culture is dynamically stable. It is usually held in place by a network of socialization practices and ordinarily only changes when a culture is transformed over generations of people. Climates, on the other hand, are more dependent on political, religious, economic and educational factors and may change within the course of a single generation.

It is important to distinguish between emotional atmospheres, climates and cultures. For example, while a people may be united in sharing a common patriotic atmosphere, they may not enjoy the mutual caring and shared ideals that are characteristic of a climate of solidarity, and, in either case, the culture may promote emotional independence or dependence. However, emotional atmospheres, climates and cultures clearly interact and influence each other. Emotional climates depend on underlying emotional culture, and both influence, and are affected by, emotional atmosphere. In fact, Durkheim argued that a society itself was unified by cultural ceremonies that invoked intense emotional atmospheres (see the interesting discussion by Fisher & Chon, 1989).

The concept of climate

The concept of climate has been used extensively in organizational psychology in an attempt to capture important differences in organizational environments. In his analysis of the

concept, Tagiuri (1968) notes that it is a molar concept (like personality) but that it is experienced as external to the actor (as part of the environment), although the actor may feel he or she contributes to its nature, and that it has a connotation of continuity but is not as lasting as culture. After surveying disparate uses of the term he concludes that it always refers to some feature of the environment that has behavioral consequences and to which people are sensitive. Noting that it is a source of behavioral variance outside of the person he defines it as, "the relatively enduring quality of the total environment that (a) is experienced by the occupants, (b) influences their behavior, and (c) can be described in terms of the values of a particular set of characteristics (or attributes) of the environment" (Tagiuri, 1968, p. 25). When applied to an organization, Tagiuri notes that climate refers to the quality of the organization's internal environment, especially as experienced by the insider, but as also relevant to outsiders.

There has been a great deal of work on organizational climate in an attempt to find variables that can be used to capture important differences in the environments of different organizations. Unfortunately, 'much of this work seems to have been guided by an attempt to focus either on objective factors (such as size, leadership patterns, communication procedures) or subjective factors (perception of the environment as friendly, as having high work standards, as recognizing good work, etc). The reason for the dichotomization into objective and subjective seems clear. Some investigators, such as Forehand and Gilmer (1964), wanted to focus on objective measurable features that influenced behavior in important ways and could be used to distinguish different organizations. Others, such as Tagiuri, wanted to stress that the environment was *interpreted* by members of the organizations and that the resulting perceptions would affect their attitudes, motivation and behavior. From their perspective, objective factors such as size or decision-making procedures were not as fruitful descriptors of climate as perceived friendliness

or openness to suggestions. Tagiuri clearly felt that something objective was being interpreted. He states, "It cannot be a common delusion since it must be vertically based on external reality." (p. 25). However, since this external reality was defined primarily as something to be perceived, the subsequent operational definitions of investigators split the idea of climate into an objective or a perceived (subjective) climate (see, for example, the review of research by James & Jones, 1974).

Neither of these paths has proved particularly fruitful, and organizational psychologists now seem to be pursuing the idea of organizational "culture." Fortunately, the concept of culture is more resistant to being split into objective and subjective measures, but there is a price to be paid if the concept is substituted for that of climate. A government is not responsible for its nation's culture. Rather, it grows out of the culture. On the other hand, governments do have some responsibility for emotional climate, and this climate, rather than culture, is a quality of the environment which surrounds people and affects their behavior within any given culture.

Fortunately, it is possible to define environment in a way that does not separate its objective and subjective attributes. Isidor Chein (1954; de Rivera, 1986) does precisely that when he defines the "objective-behavioral" environment as a description of the environment that would interest a psychologist who wanted to comprehend and predict behavior (rather than a description for a geographer, politician or auto driver). In Chein's environment there are, for example, behavioral instigators that encourage specific activities (such as hand guns, pornographic pictures, invitations to cultural events), goal objects that satisfy different needs (cars, books, sexual partners), noxients (unpleasant noise, smog levels), means-end paths (e.g., what a person needs to do to become a physician), behavioral supports and constraints (such as

the presence or absence of training schools) and social norms and attitudinal climates that steer behavior in certain directions rather than others (toward violence or compassion).

In this paper I shall focus on the emotional climate of the nation-state. By a nation's emotional climate I mean an aspect of its objective-behavioral environment. It, necessarily, affects everyone in the environment and is a characteristic of the society as composed of interacting persons. It may be observed to dominate the behavior of its citizens and others subjected to its government.

If emotions were "in" a person it would be hard to conceive how they could also be "in" a national environment. However, the structural theory of emotions (de Rivera, 1977; de Rivera & Grinkis, 1986) shows how emotions may be conceived as existing *between* people, as various sorts of attractions and repulsions between people which transform their bodies and perceptions. These emotions have structures which may be specified in precise ways. From this perspective, emotions are always in a society-though the "society" is often only two people, and may even be reduced to one person and an imaginary other.

However, a national emotional climate is not simply an aggregate of all the emotional relations existing within its boundaries. Rather, we may suppose that just as the emotions of an individual ideally function to maintain the individual's identity and values (de Rivera, 1984), the emotions of a nation may function to maintain the political unity, or cultural identity, of the people of that nation. I shall try and clarify this idea towards the end of this paper.

DESCRIPTIONS OF DIFFERENT EMOTIONAL CLIMATES

What sorts of emotional climates might different nations exhibit and how might these climates be related to underlying social, economic and political structures? Consider descriptions of some of the different climates that have been reported in past investigations:

A climate of fear has been described in El Salvador by Martin-Baro (1981, 1990); in Chile, during the Pinochet regime, by Becker *et al.*, (1990); and in Argentina, during the 1976-83 dictatorship, by Braun de Dunayevich and Puget (1989). In all cases the fear was generated by repeated acts of violence conducted by the government or by groups acting without government control over their activity. In fact, in all cases the fear appears to have been systematically cultivated by the government in order to maintain political control. The effect of such fear is to *isolate* people from one another. Any meetings of people which could conceivably be used to organize a group that could make demands upon a landowner, an industry, or the government are broken up; any person attempting to organize such meetings is threatened.

Such fear does not only affect public expressions of opinion. Once a person is suspect, his family and associates may also be threatened. Hence, people became reluctant to express their thoughts to anyone, or even to think certain thoughts. The presence of pervasive political violence also has the subtle effects on people's perceptions of reality. Martin-Baro has noted that the very idea of social reality comes into question. A red traffic light which should mean "stop" may no longer mean stop because it is when one stops that one is an easy target for gunfire. Hence, it may come to mean "be careful not to stop." Becker *et al.* (1990) note that the family of a person who has disappeared does not know whether to mourn or whether mourning would be a betrayal of someone who may still be alive; whether to protest or whether such a protest would expose the family to danger. Likewise, the nature of the ideal becomes questioned. Should one oppose the government if that opposition exposes one's family to danger? However, if one does not protest against injustice, what kind of a son, daughter or parent is one?

Because a climate of fear isolates people from one another, it is not conducive to cooperative activity, and governments which resort to it usually attempt to cultivate a more

positive type of submissive behavior. Thus, Martin-Baro (1990) observes that the ultimate objective of psychological warfare is "...not fear or terror in the face of a cruel authority, but instead insecurity in relation to an authority who is simultaneously powerful and magnanimous" (p. 96).

Martin-Baro asserts that this insecurity about one's own beliefs, judgments and feelings about what is right and what is wrong leads to a gradual acceptance of the official truth and a submission to the established order. He, himself, was particularly concerned about the role which religion played in this process, whether it encouraged submission or strengthened a faith in acting for justice.

While the use of fear in order to attain or keep political contact may appear to be a human aberration, terror has long been recognized as an instrument for controlling alien populations. In fact, Walter (1964) has suggested that it is a fairly common method for maintaining political unity *within* cultures. He argues that political theorists have failed to acknowledge the fact that numerous cultures have used (and are using) random violence as a means of preventing the development of political opposition, and that such practices are often sanctioned by the culture. Certainly most authoritarian regimes make use of a certain amount of fear in order to control opposition movements, although we shall see later that other emotional forces may also come into play. However, Walter means something more than this. He states:

The practice in authoritarian states of punishing definite acts of resistance and breaking up organizations suspected of sedition may be compared to a surgical procedure. In contrast, the process of terror, in its ideal form, may be compared to a chemical procedure. Independent social clusters and unauthorized political associations tend to dissolve in the medium of extreme fear. More than that, however, an *emotional*

environment [my italics] is created in which certain kinds of interaction cannot take place. The first efforts from which organized opposition might emerge are simply not made. ...the people in such an environment are deprived...of a capacity that naturally belongs to the members of other systems-the power of resistance. (p. 27)

Walter is clearly concerned about the fact that any human civilization might regress to the use of terror as a substitute for real unity. He notes:

Terror does not often stay within boundaries, and it is rarely provincial in its impact. Now, some writers ironically insist, it is a truly international social process, and it has helped to universalize an *emotional climate* [my italics]-an international atmosphere dominated by fright. (p. 11)

While the climate of fear described above is deliberately created in order to maintain political control, there may also be climates of fear created by complete political chaos. For example, in Lebanon in recent years there has been a fear of violence that stems from so many different sources that it is completely senseless. The important invariant in these different types of situations of fear is that people feel isolated from one another.

Is there an opposite to a climate of fear? If we imagine such a climate, it would be one where people would feel free to speak to one another, to gather into groups to publicly discuss issues, to organize political meetings and rallies. More generally, it would be a climate where people would trust each other and could easily cooperate with one another, a climate of security.

A climate of security could, conceivably, be measured by simply asking people how much they trust each other and their government. In fact, questions on how much people trust others were asked as part of a comprehensive study on the quality of life in the United States in

1971 (Campbell, Converse & Rodgers, 1976). Using a national probability sample of over 2000 people, the investigators asked (among *many* other questions) the following:

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?

Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance or would they try to be fair?

Finding intercorrelates ranging from .49 to .53, the questions (which were answered on a 5-point scale) were combined into a single score. While raw scores are not reported, the percentages of people in four categories from "high trust" to "low trust" are presented, and I believe we may consider "trust" to mean a score of 10 or over on the above items. If so, we find that in 1971 in the United States 57% of the people reported more trust than distrust. This suggests the existence of a general climate of security in 1971. It would be interesting to know what the percentages are today. I suspect they may have fallen. While Campbell, Converse and Rodgers (1976) did not ask questions about trust in government, they refer to a "progressive and substantial decline," from 1958 to 1972, in the Institute for Social Research's trust-in-government index (Campbell, Converse & Rodgers, 1976, p. 284; and see p. 30).

Ruth Benedict (1970) and Abraham Maslow (1971) argue that some *cultures* are much more secure than others. They describe the secure cultures as much pleasanter places to live that are characterized by a spirit of goodwill which is manifested by kindly people who engage in a lot of cooperative, activity. On the other hand, the insecure cultures seem full of surly, aggressive people who engage in destructive, combative behavior and feel a good deal of anxiety.

Of particular interest is a structural factor which appears to underlie the differences between cultures. A comparison (Benedict, 1970; Maslow, 1971) of four secure and four insecure cultures (which were matched along other variables) revealed one clear structural difference. The secure cultures had customs which ensured that actions and skills that benefited the individual also benefited the group. In the insecure cultures, actions that benefited the individual were at the expense of others. Benedict termed the congruence between advantages to the individual and advantages to the society "synergy." She points out that a state may be organized and run so that its accumulation of power is used for the benefit of both those in power *and* the general population (high synergy) or for the exclusive advantage of those in power at the expense of most of its citizenry (low synergy). Likewise, economic systems may be arranged in ways that create low or high synergy. In the insecure societies the economic systems were "funneling systems" arranged so that the rich got richer and the poor got poorer. On the other hand, the secure societies used "siphoning" systems that channeled wealth away from points of high concentration (often by awarding prestige to persons who made public distributions of their wealth).

Both Benedict and Maslow appear to believe that people are naturally somewhat selfish and that wealth and power will tend to accumulate in the hands of those who already have wealth and power unless some societal mechanism prevents this. Without such a mechanism the people of a society will become involved in intense competition or hostile envy and this will create an insecure climate. (Inversely, we might argue that if the people of a society are accustomed to envy rather than honor those with more wealth and power, then the society may resist economic changes that encourage private initiative.)

Even if we assume (as I do) that people are motivated, at least to some degree, by their caring for others, we arrive at a similar conclusion. Clearly if a society is arranged so that caring people lose power and prestige, then less caring and, hence, less security seems inevitable.

It should be relatively easy to measure whether the people of a society feel that public-spirited acts are rewarded or punished. If one invests capital in one's country, will one receive interest or lose one's capital? If one works for human rights, may one receive a prize or be assassinated? If one speaks out against an injustice or hazard, will one be honored or lose one's job?

Note that a climate of fear that is fostered by the government of a nation in order to *isolate* people from one another is related to the cultural insecurity described by Benedict and Maslow which *atomizes* a society. Both may also be related to a climate that may tend to *polarize* a people—a climate of instability.

A climate of instability is evidenced whenever the people of a nation cannot predict what will happen either politically or economically in the near future. The situation in the Soviet Union during 1990 provides an excellent example. People had no idea if money would retain its worth, if there would ever be goods in the stores, if the Communist party would retain power or disappear. Such situations make it impossible for a person to know what to expect or what to do. In this climate one suspects there is a danger that people will abandon freedom in order to decrease anxiety, and that people's thinking will become rigidified as they grasp for some solution. Hence, there would seem to be a danger of increased polarization as people lose openness to other points of views and become fixated on particular solutions. Conversely, if a climate of stability exists, the people of a nation may be more able to tolerate diverse views and not run any real danger of fragmentation.

While there may well be empirical studies of the effects of climates of instability or stability, I am not aware of them. However, there have been a number of attempts to measure a related variable, the degree of economic uncertainty among the public of the United States. Some investigators have asked people about the economy and then calculated the *extent of disagreement* about whether one should be optimistic or pessimistic. Others have examined the amount of variance in expected price changes. Such indices of uncertainty on a macro level show that the amount of economic uncertainty in the United States evidences considerable fluctuation, and predicts the rate of private saving. Uncertainty became notably higher in the period 1969-1978, perhaps reflecting a disorientation about economic policy (see Katona, 1979).

A climate of confidence or optimism (and its inverse, lack of confidence, pessimism, or "depression ") is often believed to underlie economic markets and the recovery or depression of these markets. Katona (1979) presents evidence that this belief has some validity. His index of consumer sentiment asks people whether they personally, and whether the country as a whole, will be having good or bad times financially in the coming year. Drops in this index successfully forecast economic recessions (which occur six-nine months after downturns in the index). It is important to note that this predictive ability is not due to the successful prediction of individual consumption (which we might expect to be better predicted by questions about intentions to buy specific consumer items). Rather it is an aggregate macro-measure, probably a measure of general atmosphere or climate. It is interesting that this measure of general mood is a better predictor than questions about specific intentions to purchase. While the latter are better predictors of individual behavior, these individual intentions occur too late in the decision-making process to have much forecasting power.

Confidence in the economy as measured by Katona is probably more an atmosphere than a climate. A climate of confidence might be said to exist when the overall economy is growing. Thus, Bensman and Vidich (1971) note that when capital is accumulating at an accelerating rate, a society is probably to be expansive in many different areas, so that all of its groups will share in the expanding opportunities. In this situation, they believe that members of groups will be more apt to compare their relative success with their own past than to make invidious comparisons with other groups. Thus, tensions between groups will be minimized, and there will be a climate of self-confidence and optimism, with stress placed on individualism and the success of individual initiative. When an economy is not expanding there will be much less emphasis on individual initiative, and this may eventually affect the society's culture. Note, for example, an observation by McClelland (1965): "In India at the present time the climate of opinion is not particularly confident...newspapers and public speeches do not yield much that can be coded as indicating the existence of a strong climate of achievement." (p. 24)

Of course, a climate of confidence may not only be a function of capital accumulation. It might also depend on societal structures that reward or punish capital accumulation. For example, confidence may depend, in part, on whether it is safe to invest in the economy of one's own nation or whether it would be more advantageous to send money out of the country. More generally, confidence in one's nation may depend on the extent to which the public believes that people in general, and their government in particular, care about the nation and its welfare rather than simply being interested in the welfare of themselves and their families or groups. Regardless of the underlying causes, it is clear that it is possible to measure and compare climates of relative confidence and depression. Thus, Oettingen and Seligman (1990) were able

to demonstrate that in 1985 people in bars in East Berlin behaved in a more depressed manner than their counterparts in West Berlin.

A climate of satisfaction might be inferred when there are high ratings on the aspiration scales used by Cantril (1965). Cantril and his associates, used a self-anchored ladder scale. They asked people to imagine the best possible future they could for themselves, and then imagine the worst state of affairs that could occur. Then they asked their respondents to imagine a 10-rung ladder where the top rung of the ladder represented the best possible future and the bottom rung the worst. Finally, the respondent was asked where he or she currently was on the ladder. Thus, while aspirations are relative and may change, the person's current state of satisfaction is indicated as relative to the future he or she can actually imagine. If we average the scores of a random sample of people within different nations, these aggregate measures could conceivably be viewed as indicating an atmosphere or a climate of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. If we assume that reasonable sampling was achieved, such a measure shows distinct differences in different nations. For example, based OQ data collected in 14 different nations between 1959 and 1962, Cantril reports satisfaction rates ranging from 6.6 in the United States, through 5.3 in West Germany, 5.2 in Japan, 4.8 in Nigeria, 4.6 in Brazil and 4.4 in Poland, to 1.6 in the Dominican Republic (with an average of 5.0). The rank order of the ratings in Cantril's total sample of 14 nations correlates .67 with an objective socioeconomic index he independently constructed.

Within the United States, measures which have been taken over the course of years (in 1959, 1964, 1971, 1972 and 1974) do not show significant fluctuations in these ratings (see Campbell, Converse & Rodgers, 1976).

It might be argued that the climate of a nation is better measured by asking people about their aspirations for their nation than for their personal aspirations. Cantril and his associates did

that. They followed their questions about personal aspirations by asking people about their wishes and fears for their nation and where they saw their nation standing on a ladder representing these aspirations. Using this measure, we again find considerable national variation, ranging from 6.7 in the United States, through 6.2 in West Germany and Nigeria, 5.3 in Japan, 5.1 in Brazil and 2.7 in the Dominican Republic (with an average of 5.6). The rank order correlation with personal ratings is .55. The correlation with the socioeconomic index is .47.

In contrast to the measures of personal satisfaction, averages of national satisfaction within the United States declined from 6.7 in 1959, to 5.4 in 1971, and to 4.8 in 1974. (I am not aware of more recent data, or data from other nations, although they may well exist.)

A *climate of dissatisfaction* arises when concrete realities have not kept pace with rising expectations or when a fall in the economy has not yet led to an adjustment of aspirations so that people experience themselves to be on a low rung of Cantril's ladder scale. One might expect that this sense of relative deprivation might be expressed in changes in political leadership or in outbreaks of violence. With this in mind, Gurr (1970) correlated Cantril's scores on degree of personal satisfaction in different nations with his own measure of magnitude of turmoil in different nations. (His measure was based on the proportion of the population participating in demonstrations and riots, and the duration and intensity of such events.) He found a strong relationship between climate of dissatisfaction (my terminology) and magnitude of turmoil. ($\rho = .59, N = 13$.) (I wondered if magnitude of turmoil could be just as easily related to objective socio-economic status but calculated a ρ of only .30.)

Does a climate of dissatisfaction really predict political turmoil? There are three important qualifications which must be kept in mind. First, we are speaking of a collective climate and not an individual dissatisfaction. That is, many studies do *not* indicate a strong

relationship between individual dissatisfaction and participation in political violence (see Muller, 1980).

Second, adequate sampling is crucial. It should be noted that Gurr does not include Cantril's data for the United States in his study on the grounds that its relatively high levels of turmoil in the 1960 were due to the relatively high level of dissatisfaction in black Americans (who he states were not sufficiently included in Cantril's sample).

Third, dissatisfaction should be measured with regard to different standards of comparison. Campbell, Converse and Rodgers (1976; see Chapter 6 in particular) contrast a number of such standards. In this regard, Walker and Pettigrew (1984) have argued that relative deprivation is particularly important when the discrepancy is based on a comparison with another group in the society, rather than simply on what oneself or one's own group had in the past. It was the sense of relative deprivation relative to other groups that was related to support for Quebec nationalism in Canada (Guimond & Dube-Simond, 1983).

Together, these qualifications suggest that studies should be conducted on the climates of dissatisfaction in different groups of people *within* the same nation. It may also be important to distinguish between aspirations and entitlements, between what one would *like* to have and what one *ought* to have. It may be argued that it is when people fail to get what they believe they *ought* to get that a climate of dissatisfaction turns to hostility.

A climate of hostility appears to occur when segments of a population are disappointed in a very particular way. George Kelly (1965) postulates that hostility occurs when there is evidence that disconfirms the system of beliefs upon which a person's actions have been based. The hostility is an attempt to extort evidence to maintain the belief system rather than suffer its loss. Barrington Moore (1978) has described this process in Germany in the 1930s. People who

did everything they believed they should do-worked hard, saved money, followed the rules-found themselves poorer each year because of inflation. He presents evidence which suggests that such people became the basic popular support for the Nazi party.

I am unaware of evidence that similar processes were involved in the build-up of racial tensions in Kampuchea, or the extent to which they have been an emotional support for ethnic tensions in other regions. However, we would suspect that climates of hostility exacerbate ethnic tensions and are intertwined with the processes of accelerating violence described by Staub (1990).

While we often think of climates of dissatisfaction and hostility as being the opposite of a climate of satisfaction, the fact that groups often become polarized suggests that a more important contrast may be with a climate of solidarity.

A climate of solidarity occurs when people feel themselves to be interdependent parts of something greater than themselves. Hence, they are willing to sacrifice for a greater good and take pride in this sacrifice. Williamson (1989) points out that this sort of feeling existed in Great Britain during the Second World War and, for a while, transcended class conflict and led to a willingness to care for the needs of strangers. A climate of solidarity may be essential for great national efforts but may be difficult to sustain. Thus commenting on problems faced by leaders of the Russian revolution, Kennon (1960, p. 181) observes:

The fact is that with the end of civil war and foreign intervention, a significant change had entered into the feelings of the people: the sort of change which invariably occurs after the dramatic and heroic moments of history. The spirit of sacrifice was giving way to lassitude, weariness with causes and ideals, a yearning for return to the reassuring preoccupations of private life. Just as the human individual cannot maintain the heroic

tone beyond a certain point in personal life, so a collective body of mankind has limits in its ability to live heroically. There comes a time when people want to eat and sleep and mend their clothes and think about their children.

While it may not be possible for such a climate to last for longer than a few years, it may be essential for the maintenance of unity when a nation is faced with a threatening situation. Such a climate seems related to climates of hope.

A climate of hope is conceivably indicated by comparing a people's degree of present and past satisfaction with how satisfied they expect to be in the future. Cantril (1965) and his associates took such measures. After people had stated their hopes and fears, and indicated their present position on this ladder of aspiration, they were asked where they (or their country) would be in five years. Clear differences were obtained in different nations. For example, looking at past, present and future personal ratings we find for the United States 5.9, 6.6, 7.8; for West Germany 4.1, 5.3, 6.2; Japan 4.6, 5.2, 6.2; Nigeria 2.8, 4.8, 7.4; Brazil 4.1, 4.6, 7.3; Poland 4.0, 4.4, 5.5; Dominican Republic 1.6, 1.6, 5.8. Note the general feeling of optimism. For the sample of 14 nations there is an average shift up from the past to the present of 0.8 and from present to future of 1.9. Note also the possibility of a dangerous over-optimism in Nigeria, Brazil and the Dominican Republic.

I am not aware of any systematic attempts to use these measurements to predict political events, or of repeated measurements in countries other than the United States. However, two observations suggest both the possible uses and the possible limitations of the data.

In 1961, following the Cuban revolution, rumors of a possible intervention by the government of the United States led Cantril to give the United States Government data which suggested that the Cuban population would not support an attempted invasion. The data gathered

a year before (15 months after Castro gained power) indicated high current and anticipated satisfaction ratings compared to the past. (The ratings were 4.1 [past], 6.4 [present], 8.4 [future]). While there is no evidence that the data influenced debates about the subsequent, abortive, invasion attempt: it seems clear that there was not much popular support for overthrowing the regime at that time.

In 1962, the Nigerian data showed a high degree of satisfaction and hope following the nation's independence in 1960. There is no hint in the ratings that in less than three years tribal tensions would erupt into a military coup leading to disastrous tribal divisions and civil war. This fact suggests that measures of national satisfaction reflect an optimism or pessimism that is only useful for relatively short-range prediction.

Ideally, a measure could be constructed that would probe more deeply into the structural factors that underlie national emotions so that it would be more a measure of climate than mood. The Nigerian data may give us certain hints about how to do this. For example, in spite of their optimistic ratings, when people stated their major fears for their nation, 51% mentioned political instability and 23% national disunity. This may be compared with the 6% who mentioned political instability and the 5% who mentioned national disunity in Egypt, and the complete lack of concern in the United States for instability and only a 1% concern for disunity. It would seem, then, that there is evidence of an underlying climate of instability in the Nigerian data but that a mood of national optimism prevented this from being reflected in the quantitative ratings.

On a deeper, more structural level, a climate of hope, as opposed to one of despair, is related to the fundamental morale of a nation and whether it can maintain its ideals in the face of adversity. In Kurt Lewin's (1948) classic analysis of morale, he suggests that morale is high when a people has the ability to maintain a tension between hoped-for ideals and actual reality. If

people simply think in terms of what is ideal, or expect that these hopes are about to be realized, they are out of touch with the grit of real political and economic reality, with difficult compromises and with work that needs to be done. Hence, while feelings may be optimistic, the high morale is only apparent. If people abandon the ideal and live only on the plane of current reality, they become too resigned to work for the ideal, or too cynical to care, and simply look out for themselves. From Lewin's perspective, the extremely high figure ratings given by the Nigerian people might be taken to indicate low tension and, hence, a type of low morale. Of course, a drop in political participation may also indicate decreasing morale and a climate of alienation. However, it should be possible to develop a positive measure of morale, a more direct measure of the tension between ideal and real. I will not attempt to do that in this paper because there are more general problems of measurement that must be examined.

PROBLEMS OF MEASUREMENT

Obtaining objective measures

We conceive of emotional climate as an objective fact. Hence, it may be best to ask questions that encourage respondents to focus out on the social world rather than in upon their feelings. Even so, in attempting to measure an objective emotional climate we must deal with the fact that people with different personalities (optimists and pessimists, repressors and sensitizers, etc) and people in different positions within a society (the elite, the upwardly mobile, the poor, members of a minority group, etc) may well perceive the climate differently. Furthermore, people may be afraid to say what they really think, or may say what they believe the other wants to hear, particularly when a climate of fear exists.

It should be relatively easy to control for personality differences by averaging scores and using adequate sampling procedures, and it may be possible to sample segments of the

population who are expected to tell the truth. Journalists, for example, although they might hesitate to be identified, occupy a role where honest reporting is expected (by contrast with politicians). And mothers may openly speak of fears for their children without threatening the unity of the state, since such fears are understood to be part of the mothering role.

However, controlling for the perceptions of people in different social positions poses a challenging problem. For example, Payne and Mansfield (1973) show that persons who are higher in an organization's hierarchy tend to perceive the organization as more equalitarian, open-minded and friendly than persons who are lower. We could, of course, take stratified samples and use aggregate measures, but we are not necessarily interested in an average perception so much as the best estimation of what we take to be an objective phenomenon. If, for example, one group within a society was feeling very satisfied and perceived an emotional climate of increased opportunity, while another group was feeling despondent and increasingly frustrated, we would not be interested in averaging their scores but in estimating the degree of the polarization that was obviously developing.

Because of all these factors, it seems desirable to develop observational as well as survey measures. On the individual level, there are several interesting behavioral indicators of emotional state. Generosity increases with happiness; size of handwriting and speed of talking decrease with depression, etc. It would be interesting to see if we could construct behavioral indicators of emotional climate. For example, a climate of fear should be reflected in an increased isolation of people. Within any given nation this might be relatively easy to measure. In Spain, for instance, people gather outside to talk; however, during the Franco dictatorship this custom notably diminished.

If at all possible it would be desirable to have some sort of standard measures that could be used in different nations, and this suggests that the survey situation itself might be used. For example, when a climate of fear is pervasive it has been noted that people fail to answer more questions, particularly ones that might reflect on the government. In repressive climates people may even avoid talking about schools-or anything that may have to do with governmental policy. By arranging questions so that they increase in sensitivity, patterns of avoidance might be easily noted and rated. Triandis (personal communication) has suggested that response latency might also be used to indicate the presence of fear in sensitive areas.

Journalists know what issues are off-limits and cannot be discussed in print within their own country. In Turkey in 1989 one could not mention the fact that a Kurdish ethnic group existed; in Mexico one could not criticize any President who was in office. These limits to free speech in the press always indicate sensitive political problems that bound the region of freedom within any given nation. Such restrictions, together with records of the killing of journalists, provide objective data that can be correlated with the perception of an emotional climate of fear.

Conversely, an increase in a climate of mutual caring might be reflected in a greater openness with a stranger like a pollster. If, for example, an interviewer gave an opportunity for a respondent to volunteer an opinion about the head of the national government, or to sign a petition in favor of improving prison conditions, one might adduce behavior that would indicate a caring climate.

National vs. local climates

Is there really *an* emotional climate in a nation or are there actually many-differing from neighborhood to neighborhood, from class to class, from one ethnic group to another? Certainly, there are important local climates. Consider this, for example, variations in the general feeling of

trust that existed in the United States in 1971. Previously, we noted that the level was high 57%. However, Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers (1976) report that, while 63% of white respondents reported trust, this was true of only 28% of black respondents.

In a similar vein, Chein's data (see de Rivera, 1986) demonstrated that 83% of New York City's heroin addicts came from only 15% of its census tracts. His analysis convincingly demonstrates that some neighborhoods have far more anomie (in Durkheim's sense) than others. Likewise, Bensman and Vidich's (1971) analysis of the effects of economic fluctuations shows how certain economic expansions and contractions may have a different impact on different social groups, leading some to become self-assured and future-oriented, while others become depressed or resentful. Given differences in emotional climate within a nation, are we justified in speaking of a national climate?

In one sense we clearly are not. In fact, people need to be made more aware of climatic differences and governments need to address them. In another sense, however, the very existence of a national government organizes a national climate that impinges, for good or ill, on local climates. The real question appears to be how to distinguish it from local climate and how to measure the extent of its impact. At least three possibilities seem worth exploring.

(1) Questions could be asked specifically about the nation, and answers could then be compared to questions which focus on the person's neighborhood or on personal life. In fact this was done in Cantril's (1965) study when people were first asked for their personal hopes and fears and then, separately, asked for their hopes and fears for the nation. When this is done, most people seem to evidence relatively little connection between the personal and national. Thus, in Cantril's study correlations between personal satisfaction and satisfaction with the nation ranged from .08 in the United States to .40 in Nigeria. Reflecting upon the United States data, we note

that internal warfare has not occurred in over 100 years, that a large-scale economic upheaval has not occurred in over 50, and that violent crime and unemployment have been fairly well isolated from most people's lives. Hence, many people may be unaware of how much their personal welfare depends on the welfare of the nation.

Certainly a lack of connection seems demonstrated whenever measures are taken separately. In Cantril's study, the 1959 U.S. sample shows 48% of people mentioning peace as a hope and 51% mentioning war as a fear for the nation, but only 10% mentioning an improved international situation as a personal hope, and only 24% mentioning the international situation as a personal fear. (Health and the state of the economy are much more important-mentioned by over 50%.) Compare this with the Polish data in 1962 where peace was mentioned as a *personal* hope by 20% and war as a *personal* fear by 62% of the sample. One might be tempted to use the comparison between national and personal as a measure in its own right, except that in the Yugoslavian sample only 7% mentioned peace as a personal hope (in spite of the fact that Yugoslavia, like Poland, had recently suffered war).

In the Campbell, Converse & Rodgers (1976) study on the quality of American life, when people were asked to rate the importance of 12 different domains of life, 62% rated "a good country to live in-a country with a good government" as extremely important. This proportion is larger than for most domains and is exceeded only by health, marriage and having a good family life. However, when people rated how satisfied they were with their life as a whole, their general ratings were *not* highly predicted by their satisfaction with national government. (They were predicted by satisfaction with family life, marriage and financial situation.) Since satisfaction with health was also not very predictive, the investigators note that "...these domains are hard to rate as unimportant when attention is drawn to them in a hypothetical or abstract sense. Yet when

no malfunctions on either domain are vitally intruding on the daily lives of most of our respondents, they are easy to take for granted and hence show very little impact on the sense of well being" (p. 86). In line with this relative separation of national and personal life, we saw earlier that people in the United States evidence less and less optimism about the nation but continue to feel optimistic about their personal lives.

Thus, when we ask separate questions about the nation and personal life, there is relatively little connection. The emotional climate of the nation seems far less influential than the emotional climate of one's home.

(2) Questions might be designed which ask a person to relate his or her personal life to the national atmosphere. Answers could then be compared from one region to another. By designing questions which specifically ask people to relate their personal life to the national climate in concrete ways, we might raise the level of awareness about how national climate impacts the climate of one's neighborhood, family or personal life. We might, for example, ask a question such as "When you think of yourself as a person 'who lives in (or is a citizen of)-what are your wishes and hopes for the future of yourself and your country?" We could then empirically ascertain the percentage of people who mention national as well as personal concerns. This is certainly an aspect of the emotional climate of responsibility or alienation in its own right. If desirable, we could distinguish between economic, political and social climates by inquiring, for example, "When you think of your economic future in [name of nation] and the economic future of [name of nation], what are your wishes and hopes for yourself and the nation?"

Alternatively, one could begin by asking direct questions which reflect on the emotional climate of one's neighborhood (e.g., "Would you say that most people in your neighborhood can

be trusted, or is it better to be very careful in dealing with them?"; "What are the opportunities for work around here?") and then inquire into the perceived relationship between that climate and the national climate and government (e.g., "Does the government effect that in any way?"). It would then be interesting to compare the perceptions of people in different regions.

(3) Questions might be asked about how people perceive the climates of different areas or groups. Usually, problematic regions-ghetto areas, prisons, refugee camps-are hidden, and distinct ethnic or class neighborhoods are isolated from one another by almost invisible boundaries. An important aspect of national climate may be the extent to which groups are isolated or integrated and how aware most people are of the emotional climate of the different groups, how accurate their perceptions are, and the extent to which they can empathize with the viewpoint of other groups. While it would appear difficult to design questions that could separate knowledge from stereotypes, a good beginning might be made by simply asking people to draw crude maps of their own city and note districts within which they would feel uncomfortable, insecure or afraid, and then comparing their descriptions of the emotional climate in these regions with the actual descriptions of the inhabitants.

Types or dimensions of climate?

While I have described different *types* of climates, it might be desirable to use these types to anchor the ends of different *dimensions*, which could then be used to characterize climate. We might, for example, describe a nation's climate by using dimensions such as those shown in Table 1, where the first two dimensions describe how the people of a society relate to one another and the latter describe how the people relate to their ideals. Possibly such dimensions should be treated as underlying structural factors that influence what type of emotional climate

will prevail at a given time. In any case they may provide the flexibility necessary for the description of complex climatic conditions and changes.

INSERT TABLE 1 HERE

While these dimensions are not completely independent *of* one another, I believe they cannot be collapsed without losing descriptive power. For example, hostility and fear often co-exist, but intergroup hostility may exist without there being an overall fear of the nation's government. Conversely, an overall climate of fear may prevent intergroup hostility from coming into existence. Likewise, security (in the sense of political freedom) often goes along with solidarity, but there are situations where one is present but the other is absent.

EMOTIONAL CLIMATE AND POLITICAL UNITY

While simple societies may be held together by emotional dynamics that unify a single group of people, it may be argued that most modern nation-states, and certainly all complex civilizations, are only possible when *diverse* groups of people are held together. That is, modern civilization depends on groups of different peoples working together, rather than fighting each other out of mutual distrust, and while such groups can be artificially held together by the force of conquest, they will split into fragments unless there is some inner coherence, a *feeling of* unity.

Examining history with this idea in mind, Dennison (1928) distinguishes between two major sorts of civilizations: patriarchal and fraternal. (Earlier, matriarchal forms did not develop beyond the tribal level of organization.) He argues that each of these types requires a different sort of emotional culture and if this culture is neglected, or not cultivated by appropriate societal mechanisms, the unity will disappear and the civilization will disintegrate. (There are, of course interesting mixtures of these forms. For example, Dennison saw the Chinese clan system

as having a strong fraternal unity but the Chinese national government as patriarchal with a tenuous emotional unity.)

The unity of a nation state may be related to the various dimensions of emotional climate previously articulated:

When a climate of solidarity exists because the people of a nation share a set of ideals, respect a common authority or are fighting a common enemy, there is a clear sense of national unity. However, this may not involve the security which permits a tolerance for diversity. To the extent that solidarity is based on enmity or on a respect for authority that is mingled with fear, there will be strong conformity pressures that will hinder expressions of ethnic diversity and true individuality. Becker's (1968) ideal of maximum individuality within maximum community can only exist to the extent that there is also a climate of security which permits the expression of both group and individual differences. And this can coincide with a climate of solidarity only to the extent that people care about one another and share some similar national ideals (see de Rivera, 1989).

In the absence of this caring, and of societal structures that reward persons who contribute to the welfare of the nation, a government will resort to varying degrees of intimidation in order to maintain control. Then, some degree of fear will be present, often masking intergroup conflict.

Intergroup conflict is always a potential threat to unification regardless of whether ethnic, familial or class conflict is involved. If a climate of dissatisfaction exists and there is enough security, a political group will organize to address the problem. This will be relatively easy to accomplish if there is confidence in the society and the political group addresses their dissatisfaction as a systemic problem that requires some structural change. However, if

circumstances lead the political group to portray the problem as *caused* by some other group, a climate of hostility will arise and polarization will begin to occur. Then civil war may ensue, or one group may seize control of the government and create a climate of fear in order to isolate people and prevent political opposition.

The latter chain of events is precisely what happened in Chile during the period 1970-1990 (see Silva, 1991). Fortunately, enough solidarity and caring persisted in the Chilean climate to permit a change of government in 1990 and the beginning of a new climate of hope and confidence. In 1991 this climate could be contrasted with the climate of despair in Argentina or Guatemala, or with the climate of hope without confidence in Mexico.

I hope that we can begin to measure these emotional climates with objective precision, that these measurements will prove to have a certain predictive power, and that they may aid the people and governments of different nations to choose policies that will result in ideal climates rather than those dangerous to our human potential.

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Acknowledgements

A preliminary draft of this chapter was discussed at a workshop on emotional climate sponsored by the Clark European Center in Luxembourg on July 12-14, 1991. I would like to thank the participants for their helpful commentary.

Table 1

Dimensions of Emotional Climate

Relation to others	
Fear (isolation)	Security (trust)
Hostility (polarization)	Solidarity (willingness to sacrifice)
Relation to ideals	
Dissatisfaction	Satisfaction
Despair	Hope
Depression	Confidence
Stability	Stability