

Integrating Psychology within the Globalizing World: A *Requiem* to the Post-Modernist Experiment with *Wissenschaft*

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Abstract Since the new beginning in 2007 of *Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science* we have brought out to the open both the reasons why the ever-widening research enterprise in psychology has largely failed to produce general knowledge, and to point to promising new directions in the field. The post-modernist turn in psychology is now over, and it is an interesting task to return to creating a universal science of psychology that is context-sensitive, and culture-inclusive. The latter goal entails a renewed focus upon qualitative analyses of time-based processes, close attention to the phenomena under study, and systematic (single-system-based—usually labeled *idiographic*) focus in empirical investigations. Through these three pathways centrality of human experiencing of culturally constructed worlds is restored as the core of psychological science. Universal principles are evident in each and every single case. Transcending post-modernist deconstruction of science happens through active international participation and a renewed focus on creating general theories. Contemporary psychology is global in ways that no longer can any country's socio-political world view dominate the field. Such international equality of contributions grants innovation of the core of the discipline, and safeguards it against assuming any single cultural myth-story as the axiomatic basis for the discipline.

Keywords Knowledge · Generalization · Experiencing · Culture · Methodology · Abductive synthesis · Boundary phenomena · Movement

The irrelevance of much of present-day psychology to human lives comes from its emphasis on mechanical aspects of reactivity to the neglect of man's wider experiences, his aspirations, and his incessant endeavour to master and to mould his environment.

Gordon Allport 1967, p. 23

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Psychology struggles with its self-identity. It tries hard to live up to the standards of science—imported from other sciences—and resists the ephemeral nature of its own phenomena. Our real psychological experience is that of the fullness of feeling, thinking, and acting as we are—here and now. These phenomena are rapid—emerge and vanish at an instant—multi-layered (as they include meta-level reflexivity), and collective (individuals—be they persons or representatives of animal species—are embedded in a wider social network). Furthermore, the psychological phenomena of here-and-now (acting, feeling, and thinking) are guided by their histories (through memory) and anticipations of the future (goal setting and actions towards future objectives).

All these features of the phenomena have—since 1960’s—became used by the wave of post-modernist deconstruction of psychology. This has mostly happened from the margins of the “mainstream”—while the latter operates on the axiomatic culture-specific features of North America—imperative for quantification, belief in evidence from large samples, and in the basic ideas of prediction and control—it is the post-modern critique that has pointed to the society-bound nature of existing research practices. Yet there is much ambiguity. On the positive side, the post-modernist efforts have widened the international base of psychology—giving voice to indigenous perspectives, and looking for new conceptual bases. On the other side—the result of the post-modernist avalanche has been the replacement of inquiry by an epistemological battlefield. The attackers have tried to tear down the notion of possibility of general knowledge (pointing to the context-dependence of psychological phenomena), while the defenders have maintained their control of means of production (research funding institutions) and of established means of proliferation of the findings of the “normal science” (e.g. the “leading” journals), and social power in “mainstream” professional organizations. As it happens on battlefields—when both the attackers and the defenders succeed—so all of the parties are rendered powerless. The real task—that of constructing a psychology that is universal while being culture-inclusive, and generalizing while being based on careful empirical analyses of individual cases (Molenaar 2004)—suffers. So—to cut the long story short—post-modernism in psychology is dead—but it is not killed by the “mainstream”. It has died in its own deconstructionist emphasis—which failed to reconstruct the discipline.

Back to the Future: What is New?

Psychology looks at the *psyche*. The focus on human deeply subjective experience was there at the times when psychology as an independent branch of *Wissenschaft*¹ was born out of philosophy and physiology in the late 19th century. The philosophies of William James, Henri Bergson, Kitaro Nishida, and William Stern created a fruitful framework for the science of psychology to proceed—yet it failed to do so. It is the *direction* of that failure—rather than the failure itself—that is symptomatic. Instead of moving in the direction of making sense of human subjective experience the discipline

¹ I keep using the German notion *Wissenschaft* when I refer to basic generalized knowledge (and ways of its construction), while using the English word *science* when referring to the common opposition of the field of activities of selected persons and social groups (“*this [what/how we do X] is science*”) with their out-group (“*this [what/how they do X] is not science*”).

got caught in a mechanistic re-construction of the *psyche* along the lines of behavioral and (later) cognitive perspectives. The volatile, transient, temporary, and internally contradictory psychological phenomena that had fed the imagination of thinkers like Shakespeare, Dostoyevsky, Chekhov and other classic writers were translated into analogues of mechanical machines. Demonstrations of the work of such machine analogs were obtained in laboratory experiments on selected “biological others”—rats, dogs, and at times other primates. It was hence not surprising that basic human phenomena—values, religious conversions, political acts of self- and other—sacrifices, war and peace—to name just few of life’s domains—remained beyond the coverage of psychology. That avoidance of complex psychological phenomena has continued over the last hundred years. It has been fortified by the reductionist imperatives that came with the dominance of the “empire of chance” (Gigerenzer et al. 1989; Toomela 2007a, 2008a) and the belief in random sampling (Valsiner and Sato 2006). Psychology as science has been afraid of the complex realities of human lives—at the risk of seeming non-science. The real danger, of course, has been to end up with non-sense—while affirming one’s role rhetorically through calling it a “real science”.

Many of the basic human themes become re-invented in a new form—under appropriate new labels—as psychology develops. It has taken a full century for psychology to (re)start asking questions about one’s feelings about life in general—under the label of “psychology of well-being” (Kahneman et al. 2003). This deeply subjective notion of “well-being” is accessible through introspection—yet the use of introspection as a solid method has been discredited since early 20th century. Psychology’s history over the past century is filled with fashions that discredit other fashions—rather than finding solutions to basic human problems.

How Cultural History Guides Psychology: Socially Preferred Research Practices

Aaro Toomela (2007a, 2008a) has recently brought to our attention the development of psychology in the second half of the 20th century along two trajectories—the North-American and the German-Austrian methodological orientations. Based on the analysis of these two trajectories already back in the 1930’s (Watson 1934), Toomela points out the intellectual impasse of the dominance of the quantitatively oriented North-American trajectory:

Last 60 years in psychological research have given us thousands, perhaps even millions, of ways how to predict statistically one psychological variable by way of another. At the same time, many fundamental questions have even not been asked because of limited methodological thinking. We still find “objective” scores without knowing how many different psychological mechanisms may underlie the same score. We do not know how psychological aspect of experimental conditions may have contributed to study results. Study of fragments gives very little to understanding of a human person as a whole... Statistical probabilistic prediction has become an end goal of studies even though *most of the thinking and insight should begin where the science of mainstream psychology seems to end now.* (Toomela 2007a, p. 18, emphasis added)

Of course any science has its temporary limits—set up by sociodigms (Yurevich 2009). In psychology the migration of dominant ideas—propagated with a missionary kind of fervent—may create “intellectual blind spots” by ways of social convention suppressing intuition of the researchers. For instance—the axiomatic acceptance of quantification as the guarantor of objectivity in psychology is possible only if the natural intuitive anti-position “*but the psychological phenomena as I experience them are all qualitative*” is weakened, or blocked (Brower 1949, p. 326). The person stops trusting one’s own introspection about psychological matters—and adopts the authoritative discourse from a (translated) introductory textbook! How is that possible?

Caught Between —isms and Social Privileging of Methods

The paradox of psychology as science—desiring to be that through insisting upon the “right” kind of “scientific method” haunts psychology over the 20th century. In some sense, psychology can be viewed as a “Puritan science”—where the question is often “what is *the right* method to use?” rather than “what research questions are worth asking, and how methods are to be derived accordingly?”. Much ideological discourse has been devoted to social positioning of oneself within some general perspective designated by an—ism (*mentalism*, *behaviorism*, *cognitivism*, *interactionism*, *transactionism*, *socio-culturalism*—Matusov 2008a, b—and even *humanism*!) and setting up socially normative prescriptions for the methods through which “scientific facts” are produced. The—isms have been fighting one another for dominance in the field—leading from the “Era of Behaviorism” to the “Cognitivism Restoration”, and to further eras.

Social positioning games have their side effects. Under conditions of such positioning games basic knowledge advances slowly, in a non-linear way. We may know less about some aspect of the human *psyche* in the beginning of the technologically advanced 21st century than we knew fifty or hundred years before. The issue in psychology is not what new technological devices—computers, fMRI and statistical packages—bring to psychology, but what kinds of research questions are *not* asked (while others become popular). Thus, the issues of *religious devotion* are rarely studied by psychologists at the present time—while the popularity of the studies of *emotional intelligence* seem to fascinate psychologists and laypersons alike. It probably is easy to see that human beings have both benefitted and suffered more from religious devotion in their history than from the lack—or abundance—of emotional (or other kinds of) intelligence.

Social positioning by different “schools” brings with it disputes about methods. Psychology’s traditional toolbox of methods since the “Era of Behaviorism” has been ill-prepared to study the phenomena of personal experiencing. This has been encoded in the technical language—the history of labeling the knowledge providers in psychological studies—*observers* in introspective studies—into *subjects* in the era where the typical human being was studied on the model of the white rat (Bibace et al. 2009). Our contemporary distaste for the subservient role of the subjects (“running subjects”, or the historic notion of “being loyal subjects to the king”) that has led to the new label *research participant* interestingly overlooks the agentive

meaning of the notion of subject (subject acting upon object). Furthermore, the fact that the researcher also participates in the research encounter with the *subject*-turned-into *research participant* is overlooked by the preferred labels.

These issues of labeling are not simple questions of language use. We have here in front of us the open door into the ideological framing of research—not really a “pure” act of human inquiry. The normative purification of “the scientific method”—freeing it from the richness of the phenomena—has contributed to the poverty of our *Wissenschaft*. Psychologists’ “measure” some psychological characteristics (Michell 1999, 2004)—ironically, the “measurement” of various psychological features of human beings—personality, etc—is seen as a contribution to science, while the phenomena—temporary, never to repeat themselves—acts of conduct are let to escape the sieve of psychology’s research instruments. A “standardized method” collects answers from respondents that are immediately de-contextualized—hence losing their psychological specificity. Seemingly such methods “gather facts”—but that is precisely a problem. In general terms—psychology lacks a clear understanding of what a fact is—how it is created, and how solidly it stands within the ocean of alternative interpretations.

The Nature of Evidence: Data as Framed by Ideologies

Fact is not a given (“true”) entity, but knowledge that has been created at the intersection of the object of study, and the subject who studies the object. As such, what is constructed out of the object of investigation as a fact is a sign—some meaning that stands for some aspect of reality. Yet “facts”—in contrast to other signs—are presented as if they were “the truth”. In psychology there is no “truth” outside of context-dependency that the socio-cultural paradigms have emphasized in recent decades (Yurevich 2009), and that was prominent already in Gordon Allport’s personality theory in the 1930’s (Allport 1937).

The data are deeply ideological—in the sense of their dependence upon the interpretation framework:

Behind psychological research exists an ideological support structure. By this I mean a discipline-wide, shared system of beliefs which, while it may not be universal, maintains both the dominant methodological practices and the content of the dominant methodological educational programmes. This ideological support structure is manifest in three ways: in the contents of textbooks; in the contents of methodology courses; and in the research programmes of psychologists. In the case of measurement in psychology *this ideological support structure works to prevent psychologists from recognizing otherwise accessible methodological facts relevant to their research.* (Michell 1997, p. 374, added emphasis)

Psychology in the 21st century has much to learn from its own history—especially from the failures of the discipline to capture the crucial phenomena of human existence. It has been criticized for its pseudo-empiricism (Smedslund 1994, 1995, 1997)—proving by empirical studies what is already known through the

implications of the common language. Rephrasing Smedslund's critique—psychology is *ideologically* pseudo-empirical. Its social norms require obtaining “facts” (data) derived from the phenomena, their analyses within a prescribed normative framework, and their interpretation within a seemingly universal framework that still provides hard times for use in far-from-laboratory conditions. The value of “evidence-based science” is determined by the social rules of how *evidence* is created—and the values of its creators.

Psychology as a (Self)-Lamenting Science: From Self-Criticism to Creativity

Critical thinking about one's own discipline can be productive—but it can also be debilitating. There seems to be a vicious cycle in the ways psychologists conduct their research: they take interesting phenomena—turn these into most uninventive forms of data (quantified signs—“measures”—or imprecise qualitative “snapshots”)—and then lament about the lack of their own understanding of the complexities of the phenomena. Psychology's discourse is filled with disciplinary lament stories—the discipline seems to be in a permanent crisis (Rieber 1998; Yurevich 2009) with only few options charted out to escape from it (Doria 2009; Zittoun et al. 2009).

Laments do not solve problems—even if they may help to bring them into the focus of attention for solving them. In the first 2 years of *Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science* we have succeeded in charting out a number of new directions. A new dynamic look at the processes of human cognition has been our focus of coverage (Cornejo 2007a, b; Cunha and Salgado 2007; Hays 2007), alongside with issues of construction of gender identity (Gonçalves and Machado 2007; Iborra 2007). As psychology is globalizing the questions of collaborative research have been of importance (Akkerman et al. 2006; Arcidiacono 2007; Marková and Plichtová 2007; Pontecorvo 2007; Zittoun et al. 2007). International collaboration brings with it both the richness of varied understandings—ready to fertilize the theories—and the adaptation needs of researchers to one another's expectations for collective inquiry (Toomela 2007b). Increasing move towards institutional authorship of research results (Valsiner 2009b) and the role of immediate “impacts” changes the lives of contemporary researchers.

Psychology as a Migrant—Transcending Borders

Migration results in all kinds of adaptation issues. Migrants can be seen as maintaining their habits of origin while under “assimilation pressures” from the receiving social context—or just the opposite—show a pattern of hyper-assimilation. Can we find impact of the second trans-Atlantic migration (Europe to North America) in the ways in which psychology operates now? Is psychology under the influence of some dominant extra-scientific agenda that is a result of such migration? Frequent stories—often laments—about the dominance of “American psychology” all over the World seem to point in that direction. Yet I would argue that there are two partners in a dance (even if one leads the other)—so if there is an “effect” of the “other”, there has to be a partner who acts as the willing recipient of such influence.

The willing followers take over suggested ideas—and practices—before proceeding to complain about the “tyranny” of such ideas.

The Atlantic Crossings

After acquiring its independence from physiology and philosophy in Continental Europe (and operating in German) around 1870’s, it has been exported from Europe in all directions. There was no lament about the “European dominance” in psychology in the New World around 1890’s, nor in the 1920’s. However, the in-migrating ideas from Europe became North-American immigrants at the end of the 19th century (Valsiner and van der Veer 2000)—built upon a solidly religious life philosophies of Puritan extraction (Rieber 1998). The North-American self-liberating intellectual world adjusted the European ideas to North-American socio-moral contexts (Dolby 1977). While migrating to North America, psychology as a science become rooted in a very unique historically formed society, which has been described

...the only country in the world that was born perfect and continued to progress. American progress would be a quantitative multiplication and elaboration of its founding institutions, not a process of qualitative change (Ross 1993, p. 104)

With such background of socially engrained exceptionalism it is not surprising that the ways in which psychology as a science—as well as a practice—has proceeded over the past century guarantees the split that Toomela (2007a) highlights. It includes the replacement of science by scientism (Shames 1990)—or at least arriving at a pragmatically substantiated mixture of the two (Valsiner 2000). The result for psychology was a limited phenomenological basis for the discipline where the whole richness of human phenomena (e.g. feelings of motherhood—Sriram and Chaudhary 2004; interdependence of individualism and collectivism—Sinha and Tripathi 2001) were overlooked. Psychology suffered from the Eurocentric focus both in its scope of phenomena and of the kinds of theoretical perspectives. As the practical applications of the discipline became into focus of attention (after World War I) that limited focus was further fortified by reference to “usefulness” of knowledge. It is not surprising that the Continental European and American kinds of psychologies were distinguished in the 1930’s—since Europe and North America indeed moved in different directions in their knowledge construction.

The equality of these two directions was imbalanced by the next wave of migration. As a consequence of the historical turmoils of World War II, psychology’s center of activities had moved to North America. The applied entrepreneurship in North America in the 1920’s was a ground for extended proliferation of psychological techniques in social practices—something that in the between-wars Germany or ideologically volatile Russia in the 1920’s could not easily happen.² The

² Importantly, it is only in the 1930’s, under the restoration of economic stability in Germany under the Nazi regime—and as a part of its own build-up of the military and eugenic systems, that the practices of applied psychology got a chance for extensive development. In contrast, in the both in Germany and the Soviet Union in the 1930’s the development of the theoretical side stopped—most psychologists emigrated or were silenced, and the whole area of psychology became declared extinct in USSR in 1936.

ideas—which usually are creative under ideological and economic stress—flourished in Europe in the 1920's, but applied practices developed in the United States.

The European academic migrants who started to arrive in North America in the 1930's were powerless—having lost their university positions in Europe they had hard times getting into the academic establishment in the United States, despite their American colleagues' efforts to help. The United States was in deep recession after 1929, and the anti-foreigner feelings that usually go together with economic downturns were in existence. The applied orientation of psychology had developed rapidly in the 1920's—and framed the expectations for psychology in the 1930's. Theoretical pursuits were clearly secondary to social practices, and Central European academics had to survive under these flop-sided social demands.³ With the success of proliferation of psychology in society the focus for psychology—as exemplified in textbooks—becomes that of passive readers (Morawski 1996) where the tasks of dutiful “how to do” research in “right” ways dominates over that of new ways of knowing (Smyth 2001).

The net result of such success as it reaches our era of globalization is inherently paradoxical. On the one hand, the transfer of knowledge from “dominant centers” in psychology—proudly self-advocating themselves from their North American locations on the basis of the cultural history of exceptionalism— becomes not only accepted as an export article for psychologies in other countries, but often ardently desired by aspiring psychologists in these other societies.

On the other hand—there are voices actively arguing against such expansion—first of all in favor of development of indigenous psychologies. Yet the psychology as practiced in the U.S. society is but one of the many indigenous versions of psychology—once we do not assign it an exceptionalist status. Hence it is one among equals—and there is no reason for direct transfer of knowhow. If cries against such “neo-colonialism” of export of psychology are heard it is wise to not forget that the issue exists only because there is active desire to be set “straight” by the recipients. More importantly—such opposition of for and against transfer of research traditions and applied practices overlooks the third option—cross-fertilization by the different perspectives.

Conceptual Fertility of Inter-Cultural Variation

Migrations of course cover the whole world. New perspectives are likely to appear from such migration (e.g., Maruyama 1963, 1988). The histories of psychology in Japan (Takasuna 2007a, b) and India (Paranjpe 2002) are of some of the examples where the meeting of different cultural histories brings about innovations. Japan—for long time a country closed to foreigners until 1870's—became a place of active import of the newly established discipline from both Europe—the place of its origin—and the

³ A good example of the bifurcation of such survival is the fate of Karl and Charlotte Bühler after their arrival in the United States in 1938. Karl—world-famous theorist by that time—never found an academic position in the United States. Charlotte—younger and practice-oriented—thrived in the clinical psychology environment, finding a place under the label of “humanistic psychology”. Others had similar adaptation problems—Heinz Werner, after leaving Hamburg in 1933, could not find a permanent university professorship in the U.S. until 1947, working instead in practical contexts (Valsiner 2005b; Imanishi).

United States (where the European traditions were already being transformed by local social demands). Yet it was both the holistic direction from Germany (the Gestalt impact) and the American imports that reached Japan. Japan had no fixed alternative of its own—so its import created (and keeps creating) a complex arena for both imitation of others' practices as well as for serious innovation—helped by the fact that Japanese culture does not include fixed boundaries between different ideas (Takasuna 2007a, b; Valsiner 2008), nor between species. The latter has given rise to new ecological perspectives in evolutionary theory and primate research (Asquith 2000; de Waal 2003; Imanishi 2002).

The context of India provides a different historical trajectory—that of a culturally rich area (Chaudhary 2004) of wide historical proliferation of its heritage both towards Europe and to China and Japan—that has been in dialogue with the British colonial empire over two centuries (Paranjpe 2002). The full creativity of the social sciences as resulting from such dialogue is interestingly uneven—highly innovative perspectives in sociology are beginning to be paralleled by similar ones in psychology (Paranjpe 1998), with new ways of borrowing from the rich Indian philosophical traditions for innovating psychology (Rao et al. 2008).

What we can learn from different cultural histories is the variety of common language (and sense) bases for creating an abstract universal science. For example—the need for considering opposites united within the same whole—and the whole capable of new forms of synthesis—where the Hindu indigenous psychological heritage can in principle innovate psychological science. In the European tradition this need has been fulfilled by the traditions of Hegel and its rare applications to psychology (Abbey and Falmagne 2008; Marková 2003; Riegel 1973; Vygotsky 1927), yet this axiomatic basis has not become central for the discipline. It is far from being a *sensitizing concept* (Joffe and Staerklé 2007, p. 413)—a core basis from which to view other concepts and create empirical research practices. Instead, it is the generic social representation accepted in the occidental worlds as such sensitizing concept—such as Aristotelian two-valent logic—make the emergence of multi-trajectory holistic (yet structured) concepts much more complicated than in many cases of indigenous meaning systems. Existing meta-level social representations guide the directions of theory construction in the sciences. For example, Western psychologies have had difficulty accepting the notion of development as it entails synthetic emergence of generalized, abstracted phenomena. Likewise, the focus on gender is made to dominate over that of seniority (Oyewumi 1997)—yet to understand that one needs to look at Europe with West-African eyes.

New initiatives from India, Brazil, Colombia, Colombia, Chile, China, Japan, Korea, Portugal, Russia—to name just a few countries—are on the rise to enrich the discipline. In the work of *Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science* this is reflected in the widely international nature of the Editorial Board. Our journal overcomes the self-centered (exceptionalist) orientation in psychology in the U.S. that continues to reverberate over decades and is in place even now (Arnett 2008)—as at least 70% of membership of editorial boards of major journals are from North America. In contrast—that figure is 14% (9 out of 65) for *Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science*. We are not merely migrants—but explorers of the intellectual heritages of scholars from vastly different cultural environments. Even more importantly—the actual work of the IPBS Board in the manuscript reviewing and

solicitation leads to published articles with elaborative commentaries which are preferably solicited on a Worldwide basis.

Overcoming Major Oversights in Psychology

Whether the data construction is quantitative or qualitative, it entails distancing of the researcher's experience from the immediate experience with the phenomena, for the sake of arriving at the power of abstractive generalizations. In this sense—data are facts (signs) that are impoverished in relation to the phenomena of their origin—and not yet empowered by the act of abstractive generalization. The data are constricted versions of the phenomena—derived through researchers' actions—onto which a potentially extremely wide range of interpretational meanings are being projected.

There are three major domains of oversight in psychology:

- Eliminating *the dynamic flow* of the phenomena in the data. Our *psyche*—be it viewed through behaving, thinking, or feeling—is in a dynamic flow—yet the data generated from that flow are static representations (Wagoner and Valsiner 2005) and do not represent that dynamic flow. Our traditions of measurement fail to capture the processes that generate the temporary outcomes which are “being measured”.
- Eliminating *the hierarchical order* (part \leftrightarrow whole relations) in the transformation of phenomena into data. Each discretely observable aspect of phenomena is embedded within a context specified by its higher-order counterpart—which is often not observable as a discrete (“codable”) category. Yet it is precisely that higher-order whole that sets the stage for the functioning of the lower-order units (Diriwächter and Valsiner 2008). For example, the social representation of the notions of rights and duties (Moghaddam 2003, 2006a, b) creates the myriad of contexts within which the same discrete act (“X gives A to Y”) acquires very different meanings (“Y has the right to A” or “X has the duty to Y”).
- Eliminating *the immediate context* of the phenomenon in its transformation into data. By pre-defining coding schemes the researchers superimpose their world view onto the phenomena—rather than discover the other's worlds (Asquith 2000; Bibace et al. 2005).

Each of these elimination strategies has blocked the movement of *Wissenschaft* into a particular area of human experience. The elimination of evidence about the dynamic flow of phenomena in the data has blocked the advancement of developmental science for about a century (Cairns 1998). The elimination of hierarchical order has made it difficult to handle issues of complexity. The elimination of context has led psychology to overlook the social nature of psychological phenomena. Given all these obstacles to knowledge, it is obvious that the key to further breakthroughs in psychology is in the domain of general methodology—the cyclical relation of all features of generating new knowledge (Branco and Valsiner 1997)

Much of contemporary cognitive science is language focused—yet there is a danger of losing the complex reality of human phenomena from focus if the primacy of

affective processes is downplayed. Language is a derivative of affective encounters with the world—and encoded biologically in the brain (Panksepp 2008) in ways that let the psychological system generate high variety of affective meanings (Choi et al. 2007; Lassègue 2008; Salvatore and Venuleo 2008; Shanahan 2008). These meanings enter into the system of dialogical selves on the basis of co-phenomenology (Cornejo 2007a, b) as “voices” that regulate human conduct (Bertau 2008a, b)—creating both intra-psychological dialogues and silences (Ohnuki-Tierney 1994). Psychology and semiotics share much of common ground (Gertz et al. 2007; Innis 2008; Rosa 2007; Valsiner 2007a).

Human cognitive processes are dynamic and constructive—hence the effort in our time to take a fresh look at the legacy of Frederick Bartlett whose methods of the study of reconstructive memory are being developed further (Mori 2008; Wagoner 2008). The move towards a new look on intentionality—through recognizing the *aboutness* of all mental processes (Boesch 2008; Haye 2007) and its dialogical embeddedness (Cunha and Salgado 2007) opens a new realm of looking at the phenomena of emergence. Again we see a new development on a historically illuminated ground—the look at socially emergent intentionality through semiotic positioning of aboutness is a step beyond Franz Brentano and Alexius Meinong—yet in the direction set up by these classics of psychology. It is more than curious that the “Austrian tradition” of thought—building on Brentano’s notion of inherent intentionality—has been forgotten in psychology and finds its limited place in philosophy. Yet human actions are (often overly) meaningful and goals-oriented (and goals-generative)—hence future focused, rather than “reactions” to the past.

This mentioning of history of psychology is not a side story—we purposefully link the construction of specific aspects of integrative psychology of the future with the discipline’s past. Contrary to most of the predominantly empirical journals where history does not get a prominent focus, in *Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science* such link is our trademark. So we look at the future of attachment theory (Keller 2008) through examining its past (Harlow 2008; Mason 2008; van der Horst and van der Veer 2008). The resulting challenge to our contemporary study of attachment is twofold—the study of affective bonding processes (rather than “attachment types”) in different cultural conditions, and re-conceptualizing attachment as a bio-cultural phenomenon.

Science as Culture of Knowledge Construction

Science—as a category—is a new invention—the word *scientist* in the English language (in contrast with *artist*) was introduced as late as in 1834 by William Whewell (Yeo 1986, p.273). By differentiating the words the nature of the socially constructed activity also changed—introducing the “subjectivity” (or art) versus “objectivity” (of science) dichotomy. That dichotomy is of course very unrealistic in the lives of persons who work in science, and is not present in other languages in similar strict form (e.g., German *Wissenschaft*—knowing—does not entail such strict dichotomy).

Languages matter. Through English becoming the medium of international communication in science, the discourses about science are guided in directions that

mask the actual deeply human ways of acting in the knowledge construction process (Knorr Cetina 1999). The three components—the utopia of creating “better, cumulative knowledge”, the meanings of knowledge for persons, and the critical (deconstructive) look at their relations (Teo 1999)—have created a discourse style about science that may bring out the current *impasses*—yet without constructive innovation. However, a whole range of our contemporary scientific acts are on their way of reconstructing psychology. A major break is slowly moving into contemporary psychology—abandoning the assumption that scientific evidence in psychology is necessarily (and automatically) quantitative (Michell 2004, p. 316) or samples-based (Molenaar 2004; Salvatore et al. 2009). We can currently observe increased interest in qualitative methodology (for closest overview, see *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung*—<http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs>). The “qualitative turn” is to be expected, since psychology deals with structured wholes—and their dynamic transformation (Gelo et al. 2008; Valsiner 2005c). New horizons—which are sometimes new ways of returning to selected previously used ideas—are currently in the making.

Horizons for Psychology: Study of Transformations of Dynamic Structures

A new era in psychology is opened by return to the issues that had remained unsolved—and out of focus. Most of these issues require mutations in the axiomatic bases of the research. It is not surprising that such changes come from the periphery of the discipline, involve borrowing from other sciences, and is supported by interdisciplinary collaboration.

Straightening out the (bell) curve The elegance of complexity requires a change in the axiomatic basis of psychology—well expressed by the critique by Magoroh Maruyama of psychology’s reliance on the notion of normal distribution:

The uncritical use of the assumption of normal distribution—the bell-shaped curve—dominated psychology and social sciences. But in this assumption, something important was overlooked. Researchers tended to forget or never learned how the bell-shaped curve had been mathematically derived and defined. The normal distribution occurs when both the following conditions are satisfied: (1) The fluctuations are *random*; (2) they are *independent* of one another. But psychological and social events are neither random nor independent. Therefore it is *illogical* to assume a normal distribution. (Maruyama 1999, p. 53)

By this singular look at the misfit of the axiomatic basis of the statistical method and the nature of psychological phenomena, Maruyama has elegantly cleaned the base for building new methodological perspectives—by introducing into science the notion of deviation-amplifying processes (which are working in coordination with deviation-counteracting, i.e. equilibrating, processes—Maruyama 1963). With changing the focus of investigation from the “center” (average or prototypical cases) to the “borders” the perspective of psychology becomes reversed. Every distinguishable, i.e. “new” case is an “outlayer” in relation to its predecessors. It is

the deviating moves in human conduct that are no longer “deviations from the norm” but acts of persistent construction of novelty. It is obvious that

...human beings should not be considered “an error”. Single cases that contradict group data should not be thrown away but be described and understood. It is the “true value mythology” that should be given up in psychology as a science of human being’s life experience (Sato et al. 2007a, p. 53).

This simple basic understanding of the central role of variability has had very hard time becoming understood in psychology (Valsiner 1986). It is inherent in any developmental process (Maruyama 1963; Siegler 1996).

The focus on dynamics: emergence of developmental science The movement for developmental science (Cairns et al. 1996) became notable in the 1990’s around discussions of child and adolescent development. By its focus developmental science is necessarily holistic and individual-centered:

The point of departure for a holistic analysis of individual functioning is that an individual functions as a totality that each aspect of the structures and processes (perceptions, cognitions, plans, values, goals, motives, biological factors, conduct, and other aspects) takes on meaning from the role it plays in the total functioning of the individual (Magnusson and Törestad 1993, p. 436)

Empirically elegant work on such holistic processes cannot be reductionist—if theoretically we claim “the person is a whole” then it is the features of that whole that the empirical work needs to reveal. Such features are systemic adaptations to varied environmental conditions. It is here that contemporary psychology becomes closely linked with contemporary protein genetics (Ginsburg and Jablonka 2007a, b) and immunology—both of which deal with novelty and complexity. The task of building new methodological tools for the study of dynamic phenomena is currently on the upsurge (Valsiner et al. 2009).

Focus on emerging structures—which result in multiple trajectories In the case of all open systems, deviations are amplified in order to bring them—by some constraining conditions—to a particular limited range. Since that range unfolds in irreversible time, we can talk of trajectories—ranges of variation qualitatively different from one another that diverge from one and converge in another bifurcation point (Sato et al. 2007b). The Trajectory Equifinality Model (TEM—Sato et al. 2006, 2007b)—which was elaborated on the basis of parallel ideas (non-independence of human phenomena, non-randomness of distributions) when discussing the issues of sampling (Valsiner and Sato 2006)—allows for new ways to look at the dynamics of novelty construction. The focus on self-constructing trajectories adds a frame of generalized formal depiction to Vygotsky’s concept the non-linear reliance on life-course history. It also links psychology’s formal modeling of time-related processes with the probabilistic version of attractor theory in the dynamic systems framework—particularly the notion of *attractor ruins* (Tsuda 2001) as domains of the dynamic processes where the move to new structure starts. This dynamic process is particularly well explicated in the empirical studies of constructive memory (Mori 2008; Wagoner 2008).

The methodological credo of psychology is about to break out of its close circle of inductive *versus* deductive primacies—and become synthetic. Generation of new knowledge is an *abductive*—neither inductive nor deductive—enterprise. *Abductive synthesis*—the only kind that can create new ideas (Peirce 1935, CP 2.777)—entails a qualitative “jump” beyond what is known inductively, and what is assumed deductively. The issue of synthesis is a conceptual theme (Diriwächter and Valsiner 2008) at which psychology has arrived a number of times—and yet it has not been resolved. The pragmatic question—how to study the phenomena (rather than take positions)—still stays open (Charles and Dege 2008).

From formal relations to the study of boundary processes Open systems not merely are characterized by their variability, but they generate increasing variability—as well as constraints to keep that variability within manageable bounds. It is the boundary conditions—structured and dynamic analogues of “membranes” in biological systems—that are the core of psychological science. In a way such claim would echo some perspectives from psychology’s past—such as Kurt Lewin’s focus on boundaries—yet with a twist: it is the set of conditions of “crossing” the boundary that we need to investigate (Madureira 2007a, b). What is usually seen in psychology as a relationship of “variables” X and Y:

$$X < \{\textit{correlationally}\} \textit{ related with } > Y$$

acquires a different meaning

$$X < \{\textit{conditionally}\} \textit{ relating with } > Y$$

The “staple” *end* result of most of traditional psychology—announcements of “statistically significant” relationships between “variables” becomes the starting point for new inquiry—*what does that “relationship” mean in the dynamics of the boundary* of the X and Y that is being investigated (Valsiner 2007b). The focus on the conditional nature of the “boundary processes”—under what conditions the “membrane” opens itself for trans-border “transport”, and under which circumstances such border crossing is blocked—makes it possible to see the unity of opposites operating within the same whole.

Movement towards the idiographic focus in psychology We are witnessing a quickly developing trend towards the centrality of qualitative and single-case based methodological interests Worldwide—even in parts of the social sciences (e.g. education) in the United States. Gordon Allport’s clear vision about the centrality of the single case (Allport 1967) is finally—with some historical time-lag—about to become true (Joerchel 2007; Salvatore et al. 2008; Valsiner 1986, 2007a). Peter Molenaar made it explicit:

...psychology as an idiographic science restores the balance by focusing on the neglected time-dependent variation within a single individual (*IAV*). It brings back into scientific psychology the dedicated study of the individual, prior to pooling across other individuals. Each person is initially conceived of as a possibly unique system of interacting dynamic processes, the unfolding of which gives rise to an individual life trajectory in a high-dimensional psychological space. Bringing thus back the person into scientific psychology, it can be proven that her

return is definitive this time. Classical theorems in ergodic theory, a branch of mathematical statistics and probability theory, show that most psychological processes will have to be considered to be nonergodic (Molenaar 2004, p. 202)

Molenaar's revolutionary claim renders most of the work done in psychology over the past half-century inconsequential. Non-ergodicity means that treating inter-individual variability (which we usually label indistinctively as "variance" or "individual differences") as if it adequately reflected intra-individual (temporal) variability is not possible.

By rejection of the axiom of ergodicity in psychology we invalidate the interpretations of group-based data that are applied to individuals. Implications for both empirical research practices and practical applications of psychology are profound. The notion of *idiographic*—usually misunderstood as referring to unique descriptions not open to explanation—becomes central for generalization in science. Since the variability in-between specimens (within a sample, or a population) cannot in principle be used as a way of arriving at generalizations about the generic phenomena, it is the systematic study of single cases as organized systems—and over time—that becomes the basis for psychological generalization. Indeed the *idiographic analysis* is of a single, unique case—but its results are generalized to the phenomenon as a whole. In this sense—*idiographic science is the way of arriving at generalized knowledge through the study of single systems* (Salvatore et al. 2008).

Generalization based from single cases is not new in the sciences. There are objects of study that exist simply in their unique forms—any discernible chemical structure, a planet or galaxy in astrophysics, or the basic anatomy of a species in biology is of such kind. Paleoanthropologists arrive at general knowledge about an archaic species based even not of single cases of an excavated skeleton of the extinct species, but even on the basis of limited skeletal findings. There can never be a "representative" or "random" sample of specimens of *Homo habilis* available for a sample-based generalization about human evolution. Neither can the Mars Rover be sent to a randomly selected sample of Mars-like planets for getting a "sample" of planets (and generalize to the "population of Mars-like planets" through argumentation about "average planet"). Mars is one—it operates as a single system—and from the analysis of its unique dynamics of functioning we can arrive at general models of how planets exist in the universe. Likewise, in the history of psychology almost all classic findings are based on single case evidence. The learning curve of an animal is a generic depiction of the basic learning processes that occur in one animal—yet in ways that fit all animals. Basic social group processes can be observed in social groups in any society—albeit in specific culturally organized forms.

Psychology's move towards recognizing the centrality of the individual case for generalization is paralleled by breakthroughs in biology—the accomplishment of cell reprogramming (Gurdon and Melton 2008) indicates clearly how general biological (and developmental) principles operate through the system of unique biological organism. Of course the relevance of biological uniqueness as a general principle has never escaped the practitioners of biological organ transplanting where the (in)compatibility of the transplanted organ with the whole biological system of the recipient has been the issue of life and death. The psychological side of living has never been so acutely in question—hence the possibilities of decades of

oversight of the issue that William Stern very clearly specified at the beginning of differential psychology (Asendorpf 2000).

General Conclusions: International Synthesis of Ideas

Psychology in the 21st century is on its way to new international synthesis that has no single-country dominance of ideas and where cultural heritages of European, Asian, and American (South, Central, and North) kinds intermingle in the making of a new look at psychology. That new science restores the centrality of human experiencing into its core, treats the phenomena as these develop over time, honoring their single-case nature, and restores the qualitative—structural-functional—abstractions to the objectivity-making process in the science. It includes the co-phenomenologies (Cornejo 2007a, b) of all participating researchers—a benefit of the globalization of the knowledge base of the discipline. The widening of the set of root myth stories of psychological processes—from Oedipus to Kali to many other folk stories told and depicted as moral imperatives around the World—would create a new basis for arriving at general knowledge in psychology.

A major obstacle for finding such solution is the boundary of conceptual grasp of the emergence of novelty—as anything novel (not observed before) it cannot be predicted from what has been already observed (verified history). Yet it is precisely the organization of what exists—that verifiable history—from which novelty is produced. The “jump” emerges from its opposite—current organization.

As this making of the future is already happening in small steps—in different locations, by different psychologists—one large question remains for the historians of science—how to understand the slow, tumultuous, and often regressions-prone history of the given discipline? While the notion of ever-new progress in a science is a desirable projection by scientists to the lay public, the insiders know all too well that this is not the case. The development of ideas is slow, often blocked by social demands, and filtered through the power relations of the institutional system of the discipline in any given country. It is by making explicit these social blocking mechanisms of the past that history of psychology emerges from its designated powerless social role as a “museum discipline” and starts to lead the future development of the discipline. If we claim to make future—we are making history, and history tells us how we can do it.

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